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A web browser is an application that comes bundled with every consumer operating system, including both 
desktop and mobile platforms. A modern web browser is complex software that has access to system-level 
features, includes various plugins and requires the availability of an Internet connection. Like any multifaceted 
software products, web browsers are prone to numerous vulnerabilities. Exploitation of these vulnerabilities can 
result in destructive consequences ranging from identity theft to network infrastructure damage. BeEF, the 
Browser Exploitation Framework, allows taking advantage of these vulnerabilities to launch a diverse range of 
readily available attacks from within the browser context. Existing defensive approaches aimed at hardening 
network perimeters and detecting common threats based on traffic analysis have not been found successful in the 
context of BeEF detection. This paper presents a proof-of-concept approach to BeEF detection in its own 
operating environment – the web browser – based on global context monitoring, abstract syntax tree 
fingerprinting and real-time network traffic analysis.  
Keywords 
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INTRODUCTION 
JavaScript is an integral part of the modern web as it enables the delivery of highly interactive web applications 
and is supported by all contemporary browsers. However, it can also be abused to attack client browsers. There 
are a number of different JavaScript-based threats, such as heap-spraying code injection attacks, cross-site 
scripting (XSS) and drive-by downloads (Marco Cova, Kruegel, & Vigna, 2010; Oriyano & Shimonski, 2012; 
Ratanaworabhan, Livshits, & Zorn, 2009). These threats are made possible because browsers are commonly 
configured to execute inherently untrusted code. 
The Browser Exploitation Framework (BeEF) leverages untrusted code execution to provide the functionality to 
exploit browsers with the aim of supporting penetration testing. The ability to detect the behaviour exhibited by 
BeEF is important to identify client-based attacks as well as potentially hostile code. In this paper we will 
investigate some of the behavioural traits of BeEF and present a proof-of-concept approach aimed at its 
detection within the browser.  
EXPLOITING THE BROWSER 
Man-in-the-Browser Attacks 
Man-in-the-Browser (MitB) attack operates at the Application Layer and targets the client browser (Alcorn, 
Frichot, & Orru, 2014, p. 60). While Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks usually require a compromised or 
inserted hardware component to facilitate the interception, MitB attacks are software-driven (Dougan & Curran, 
2012, p. 30). The general capabilities of MitB include the ability to steal data, modify client requests and server 
responses in real time, selective targeting and two-way communication to a command and control (C&C) server 
(Dougan & Curran, 2012, pp. 31-33).  
Various kinds of specialised banking malware, such as Zeus, SpyEye and Bugat, leverage these capabilities. 
Specifically, these types of malware support transparent injection of malicious content into the original HTTP 
responses with the aim to trick the user into supplying their banking credentials (Dougan & Curran, 2012, p. 35; 
IOActive, 2012; Silva, Silva, Pinto, & Salles, 2013, p. 397; Sood, Enbody, & Bansal, 2013, p. 445). For 
instance, the Web Injects module of SpyEye as well as the httpinjects section of the Bugat bot configuration file 
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allow defining targeted injection and replacement rules based on the URL, request method and provided HTML 
elements (StopMalvertising.com, 2014). 
Browser Exploitation Framework (BeEF) 
While certain types of malware infect the underlying software components and libraries to gain access to the 
relevant system calls, MitB capabilities can be realised purely in the context of the client browser. This 
approach is adopted by BeEF – an open-source project that provides a convenient mechanism to perform 
browser-focused penetration tests (Alcorn, 2014). The inception of BeEF dates back to 2005, when its first 
public release was inspired by research into advanced XSS and persistent bidirectional victim-to-attacker 
communication (Orru, 2011; Rager, 2005). BeEF also builds upon research into inter-protocol communication 
and exploitation (Alcorn, 2007). 
The primary purpose of the framework is to “assess the actual security posture of a target environment by using 
client-side attack vectors” (Alcorn, 2014). This notion assumes a traditional approach to network security that 
focuses on perimeter defence and makes use of firewalls to filter packets on numerous ports but those 
commonly used by HTTP (Alcorn et al., 2014, p. 17). The authors of BeEF suggest that web browser attack 
surface is “large and ever-increasing”, due to its continuously expanding feature set (Alcorn et al., 2014, pp. 18-
20). BeEF can be used to target this surface in order to bypass traditional external perimeter defence and gain 
access to internal targets that would otherwise be inaccessible.  
In practice, the usage of BeEF follows a prescribed browser hacking methodology, which consists of three high-
level phases - initiating, retaining and attacking (Alcorn et al., 2014, p. 23). During the initiation phase, the 
browser encounters and executes the hook script, which contains a set of instructions required to initiate the 
communication channel between the browser and the C&C server. The browser can be tricked into executing 
this script using social engineering, XSS attacks, compromised web applications, advertising networks and 
MitM attacks (Alcorn et al., 2014, pp. 32-72). The retaining phase is concerned with establishing an active and 
persistent communication channel to enable the attacking phase. BeEF relies on HTTP to facilitate the 
communication via XMLHttpRequest (XHR) polling or HTML5 WebSockets. The latter offers better 
performance through bidirectional communication as well as reduced detection as firewalls are generally 
unfamiliar with this protocol (Erkkilä, 2012). Channel persistence is achieved via means of full-window frame 
overlays, browser events, pop-under windows and various MitB techniques. The attacking phase involves the 
delivery of JavaScript payloads to the browser, which executes them and communicates the result back to the 
C&C server. BeEF incorporates a collection of commands that can target different entities ranging from user 
credentials to internal network resources. The framework provides a diverse range of features including but not 
limited to: 
 Browser fingerprinting 
 Network enumeration and inter-protocol exploitation 
 Key logging to extract sensitive data, such as credentials and personal information 
 Ability to use the victim browser as the proxy 
 Numerous social engineering modules, such as spoofed LastPass and Evernote login dialogs 
 Chrome extension exploitation 
 Integration with the Metasploit penetration-testing framework 
 Client-side detection evasion via minification and obfuscation 
 
 
Figure 1. BeEF and Metasploit Attack Scenario 
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 Figure 1 depicts a high-level overview of a client attack using BeEF. The browser that has executed the hook 
script is referred to as a zombie that has been hooked. The ability of BeEF to integrate with the Metasploit 
penetration-testing framework deserves a separate mention, as it significantly expands its capabilities. 
Leveraging this integration, one could take advantage of the Metasploit browser autopwn module to attempt 
automated browser exploitation to obtain a reverse shell on the target machine. Other tools that leverage similar 
concepts exist - such as Waldo by Shekyan (2012) and XSSChef by Kotowicz (2012), which focuses on 
Chrome browser extension exploitation. 
RELATED WORK 
As this study is concerned with client-side detection, we examined some of the existing techniques used to 
detect and protect against JavaScript malware. The taxonomy of mitigation approaches was previously proposed 
by Yin (2013, p. 17) and is presented in Figure 2. Based on this taxonomy, we classify the detection approaches 
into three types of analysis – static, dynamic and hybrid. Whereas static analysis examines the source code of a 
computer program statically without execution, dynamic analysis is concerned with studying the behaviour of a 
running program (Chess & McGraw, 2004, p. 32). A hybrid approach uses a combination of the two techniques 
to compensate for the shortcomings of each. 
 
 
Figure 2. Taxonomy of Mitigation Approaches Against JavaScript-based Threats  
(adapted from Yin (2013, p. 17)) 
 
Static analysis can be used to detect specific function invocations that are present in the obfuscated code – an 
evasion technique often adopted by the creators of malicious scripts (Xu, Zhang, & Zhu, 2013). Another static 
technique involves the construction of an Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) that uses nodes to represent language 
constructs. This is a popular technique that can be used to identify syntax and structural elements commonly 
present in JavaScript malware and subsequently detect other scripts that incorporate these elements (Blanc, 
Miyamoto, Akiyama, & Kadobayashi, 2012; Curtsinger, Livshits, Zorn, & Seifert, 2011). In addition to 
malware detection, static analysis techniques can be used for code cloning and plagiarism detection (Beth, 2014; 
Nilsson, 2012; Roy, Cordy, & Koschke, 2009). 
Dynamic analysis is usually performed in an emulated environment, such as a client honeypot or a honeyclinet, 
script execution sandbox or an instrumented browser (Yin, 2013, pp. 19-20). This technique has been used to 
create a custom sandbox that offers complete JavaScript API support where script calls are examined before 
being allowed access to the original global context (Terrace, Beard, & Katta, 2012). Dynamic analysis can also 
be implemented using an emulated web-browsing environment such as HtmlUnit that mimics multiple platform 
configurations, as JavaScript malware commonly relies on client fingerprinting to accomplish platform-specific 
exploitation (Marco Cova et al., 2010). Furthermore, browser emulation can be utilised to perform large-scale 
automated collection of malware to record infection trails for subsequent replay and in-depth analysis (Chen, 
Gu, Zhuge, Nazario, & Han, 2011). Client honeypots providing varying degree of interactivity can also be used 
to emulate common vulnerabilities to provide insight into practical client-side attack techniques (Nazario, 2009; 
Seifert & Steenson, 2006). 
Hybrid analysis requires access to both the source code as well as the runtime execution context.  For example, 
a runtime component can be used to intercept specific function invocations to perform the subsequent argument 
analysis statically (Curtsinger et al., 2011). In addition, monitoring the runtime behaviour of selected HTML 
tags and their attributes can be adopted to identify known malicious behaviours and inform the end-user in real 
time (Kishore, Mallesh, Jyostna, Eswari, & Sarma, 2014). 
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However, the client-side hook component of BeEF does not necessarily exhibit malicious traits. We analysed 
both the plain text and obfuscated versions of the client hook script using Wepawet and Jsunpack, both of which 
recognised the script as being benign (M Cova, 2013; Hartstein, 2009). Furthermore, we determined that 
detection and protection mechanisms utilised by the JSGuard Firefox add-on by Kishore et al. (2014) were 
ineffective against BeEF. These findings lead us to believe that a different approach would be required to 
facilitate its detection. 
BEEF DETECTION 
To identify detectable characteristics, we examined the architecture and behavioural patterns of BeEF. For the 
purposes of this paper, we assume that the initiation phase is complete and that the client browser has executed 
the hook script. Based on our analysis, we identified a common behavioural pattern that consists of the initial 
fingerprinting activity, followed by one or more commands aimed at ensuring persistence, which, in turn, are 
followed by context-specific attack payloads. Immediately upon the execution, the script accesses a number of 
specific properties to fingerprint the browser and the underlying operating platform. This information is sent 
back to the C&C server, which registers the browser as an active zombie.  
 
 
Figure 3. Representative BeEF Behavioural Pattern 
 
From this point on, the hook script maintains the channel by issuing heartbeat requests at predefined intervals. 
However, none of the necessarily malicious behaviour has been exhibited so far. For instance, XHR polling can 
be used as a legitimate technique to achieve near real-time communication for a rich Internet application (RIA). 
An example of heartbeat traffic is presented in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4. A Sample Of C&C Heartbeat Traffic Sent Via WebSocket 
 
To exploit the client, an attacker can choose from a plethora of commands logically categorised into modules, 
such as browser, network, persistence and social engineering. Command invocation involves the delivery and 
execution of JavaScript payloads that often have configurable parameters to tailor the attack to the particular 
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environment. Once executed, the payload is queued and delivered to the client. Moreover, multiple payloads can 
be delivered as part of the same C&C response if multiple commands have been queued within the configured 
polling interval.  
 
 
Figure 5. Payload Delivery as Obfuscated JavaScript Via XHR Polling 
 
An example of a multi-command payload is presented in Figure 5. As an evasion technique, the payloads can be 
obfuscated and an additional evasion technique is used to conceal the execution call. Upon the execution, the 
results are sent back to the C&C server. When using an XHR-based communication channel, results can be 
delivered in multiple base64-encoded chunks of pre-defined size as an additional evasion mechanism. An 
example of command execution result parameter set is presented in Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6. Payload Execution Results Delivery Via XHR Polling 
 
To speed up the exploitation process, command execution can be automated. Using the BeEF Injection 
Framework by SpiderLabs (2014) an attacker could specify a set of commands and corresponding parameters to 
be executed automatically upon the browser becoming hooked. 
Browser Fingerprinting Activity 
The exhibited fingerprinting activity appears to rely on more than 2,000 property access invocations. In contrast, 
the original project by the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) achieves this goal using less than 600 property 
access calls (Eckersley, 2011). Another library called fingerprintjs performs this task using less than 10 calls 
(Vasilyev, 2014). While high-volume fingerprinting activity is not an explicit indication of malware, it could be 
used to suggest potential BeEF presence, especially when coupled with other indicators. 
Global Namespace Object 
Our inspection of the client-side hook script revealed that it registered a custom object in the global window 
namespace. The evasion techniques employed by BeEF can be used to randomise its name as well as the names 
of any other variables referenced within, which can be used to bypass static filters. However, previous work 
indicates that a combination of analysis techniques including AST-based fingerprinting can be adapted to aid 
with detection under these circumstances. 
 
 
Figure 7. Sample Function Source (left) and Corresponding Concatenated String AST Representation (right) for 
Hash Value “e7f892feca616bf59b59949afe8e3264a721f272” 
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While runtime function decompilation in JavaScript is non-standard and implementation-dependent, WebKit-
based browsers such as Google Chrome provide the ability to access the source code of user-defined functions 
(Zaytsev, 2014). Subsequently, we used a scriptable environment based on PhantomJS and CasperJS by 
Hidayat (2014); Perriault (2013) to construct and compute the hashes of the ASTs of all methods available in the 
global BeEF object version 0.4.3.1 to 0.4.5.0. A sample function source and its corresponding AST string are 
presented in Figure 7. The version range represents more than two years of development and includes most of 
the Ruby-based versions publically available at the time of writing. As shown on Table 1, we determined that 95 
method hashes were present in all of the analysed versions and 80% of versions had unique version-specific 
methods.  
 
Table 1. Method AST Hash Statistics for Analysed BeEF Versions  
Version Common Non-common Total Unique 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0.4.3.1 95 41 136 5 10 1 5 3 0 2 1 2 1 
0.4.3.2 95 41 136 2 10 3 5 3 0 2 1 2 2 
0.4.3.3 95 43 138 4 1 3 5 3 2 6 1 2 2 
0.4.3.4 95 45 140 2 1 3 5 3 2 7 2 2 2 
0.4.3.5 95 47 142 4 0 1 2 3 3 7 2 2 2 
0.4.3.6 95 51 146 2 1 2 3 2 3 8 2 3 2 
0.4.3.7 95 53 148 3 1 1 3 2 3 8 2 3 2 
0.4.3.8 95 54 149 2 1 1 3 2 3 7 2 3 2 
0.4.3.9 95 56 151 3 2 0 1 2 1 7 1 3 3 
0.4.4.1 95 59 154 3 3 0 0 2 1 3 1 1 3 
0.4.4.2.1 95 67 162 4 2 0 0 0 0 5 1 1 2 
0.4.4.3 95 70 165 3 0 2 0 0 0 5 0 1 6 
0.4.4.4 95 75 170 0 2 2 1 1 1 4 1 9 6 
0.4.4.4.1 95 75 170 0 2 2 1 1 1 4 1 9 6 
0.4.4.5 95 74 169 2 0 0 2 1 1 5 1 8 6 
0.4.4.6 95 77 172 2 0 1 2 1 3 5 1 8 6 
0.4.4.6.1 95 78 173 0 3 1 1 2 3 5 1 8 6 
0.4.4.7 95 78 173 0 3 1 6 1 3 2 1 8 6 
0.4.4.8 95 79 174 4 1 3 5 1 2 2 1 8 5 
0.4.4.9 95 80 175 4 8 3 5 1 2 2 1 8 5 
0.4.5.0 95 85 180 11 7 3 5 1 2 2 0 8 5 
 
Subsequently, having access to the global namespace, we could analyse non-native global objects to identify 
matches against the derived collection of AST hash-based fingerprints.  
Heartbeat Traffic 
According to GitHub (2012), network communication obfuscation through endpoint URL randomisation is 
listed on the current roadmap, but it has not been implemented yet. This means that the same C&C server 
endpoint is utilised for heartbeat traffic. XHR-based heartbeat messages follow the same format with the only 
difference being the value of the “_” parameter that is updated to reflect the current timestamp.  In the case of 
WebSockets, the socket is used to deliver the heartbeat messages as well as commands and execution results. 
WebSocket-based heartbeat messages are identical. The frequency of these messages is determined by the 
configured polling interval, which does not change while the C&C server is running. Assuming BeEF heartbeat 
traffic is characterised by messages of identical length being delivered at regular intervals to the same endpoint, 
we could utilise timing and length-based analysis to detect this behaviour (Wright, Monrose, & Masson, 2006). 
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Command Payloads 
Regardless of whether the built-in evasion mechanisms are used or not, the delivered payloads are represented 
as syntactically valid JavaScript, as execution involves running it verbatim. Until a more evasive technique is 
introduced, XHR response and socket message payload analysis could be used to identify JavaScript payloads 
as one of the detectable characteristics. 
Practical Detection Approach 
Our detection approach is based on observing the previously described characteristics in the context of the client 
browser. To achieve this goal, we implemented a custom Google Chrome extension. The latest extension 
development framework addresses the previous limitations described by Heiderich, Frosch, and Holz (2011, p. 
12). The architecture of the BeEF detector extension is presented in Figure 8. The content script is injected into 
the limited-access context before any other scripts. Subsequently, the content script is able to inject a custom 
window script into the global context to complete the necessary environment preparation in time. Specifically, it 
ensures that fingerprinting activity as well as XHR and WebSocket-based traffic can be intercepted and that the 




Figure 8. BeEF Detector Chrome Extension Architecture 
 
The window script uses custom events to communicate with the content script, which uses native extension 
messaging to communicate with the background script that runs in the background persistently. This means that 
any resource-intensive processing such as AST hash computations can be offloaded to the background page to 
minimise the impact on the browsing experience. The background page uses a worker pool to parallelise the 
analysis tasks.  
 
Figure 9. Real-Time Detection Status Feedback Using a Popup Page 
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 The background page also uses native extension messaging to communicate with a separate popup page that is 
used to provide real-time feedback on detectable characteristics for all browser tabs, as shown in Figure 9. 
Furthermore, the Chrome notifications API is used to issue user warnings on significant events such as high 
probability BeEF object match or JavaScript payload detection. 
DISCUSSION 
The proof-of-concept extension was implemented and tested against the analysed versions of BeEF. The 
extension was able to distinguish excessive fingerprinting behaviour, identify the BeEF object in the global 
window namespace, as well as detect heartbeat traffic and JavaScript payloads within seconds of the hook script 
being executed. To achieve a wider practical utilisation, the finalised extension could potentially be bundled as 
part of the enterprise Managed Operating Environment (MOE) or offered via the Chrome Web Store.  
As part of testing, we also discovered a weakness in the handling of the incoming data by the C&C endpoint 
when using WebSockets. The protocol suggests that the connection should be closed when invalid data is 
received (Erkkilä, 2012). However, sending an arbitrary message renders the C&C server unresponsive 
requiring a subsequent restart. Consideration should be given to the incorporation of additional evasion 
techniques and defensive mechanisms to decrease the likelihood of BeEF becoming a target of such 
counterattack. For instance, caching commonly accessed properties could reduce the visible fingerprinting 
activity and anonymous functions could be utilised to conceal the BeEF object (Heiderich et al., 2011, p. 12).  
While our initial tests found the described approach to be effective, it is not without limitations. Firstly, the 
extension is only compatible with the Chrome browser and additional research is required to determine the 
feasibility of porting it to other browsers. Secondly, the detection requires the window script to be injected and 
executed before any other scripts and, therefore, timing issues could impair the detection ability. Thirdly, the 
approach relies on a signature database that will need to be kept up-to-date to account for new releases. Finally, 
the approach has not been verified against the attacks in the wild and it may be possible that there are heavily 
modified versions that do not exhibit the analysed characteristics. 
CONCLUSION 
Client-side attacks based on JavaScript abuse continue to be of concern, reinforcing the need for improved 
browser security and specialised protection mechanisms. In the case of BeEF, while the client-side component is 
not necessarily inherently malicious, it does facilitate means of launching specialised attacks in a controlled and 
possibly automated way. In this paper we focused on the identification of detectable behavioural characteristics 
of BeEF and described a proof-of-concept detection approach that was verified against a number of recent 
publically available versions. The initial findings suggest its potential suitability, but also highlight a number of 
important limitations. This study is the first step towards client-side BeEF detection and future research should 
aim at conducting a wider evaluation and further refinement and optimisation of the described proof-of-concept.  
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